We are a security research group in the NS unit, CNS division, at the Computer Science and Engineering department (joint between Chalmers University of Technology and University of Gothenburg). We also connect with researchers across units through the Chalmers Security & Privacy Lab.
We focus on attacks and defenses in networked systems, with emphasis on Internet routing, blockchain peer-to-peer networks, and distributed infrastructure. The lab is led by Dr. Muoi Tran. For recent updates, see our activity report (2025).
We are hiring
1 open position — PhD and Postdoc opportunities in network security.
The application for our postdoc position in Secure Distributed AI Systems is now open! Funded by WASP for two years, the postdoc will build their own research line on securing distributed AI training and inference against network-based threats. We welcome candidates with a background in security, networking, distributed systems, formal methods, or applied cryptography. No prior work on AI is required! The planned start is August 2027 (negotiable), and the application deadline is 31 January, 2027.
We just published a new blog article on a year of running NS Meetups, the weekly seminar of our Network and Systems unit. The post looks back at what worked, what did not, and what we are trying next. If you are elsewhere at Chalmers or GU and fancy giving a talk, consider this an open invitation — Wednesdays at 13:00, EDIT 8103.
We’re excited to welcome Sarat today as a new WASP PhD student! Chalmers is already familiar territory for Sarat, who received his master’s degree here not too long ago. During his PhD, Sarat will work at the intersection of network security and distributed systems.
A very warm welcome to the lab, Sarat!
Our paper on studying the routing centralization and its impact on content censorship in IPFS has been accepted at the 28th International Symposium on Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems (SSS ‘26’).
We show that while IPFS promises censorship-resistant storage through decentralization, its content providers are largely exposed to routing attacks in practice. This potentially leads to large-scale censorship attacks, e.g., a single AS-level adversary hijacking roughly 100 IP prefixes can block more than 75% of all tested content from over 57% of requesters!
The full paper will be available soon.
Glad to share that we have two posters accepted at the upcoming ACM CCS 2026! They are about preliminary results on (1) measuring impacts of hardware contention on AI workloads and (2) evading the state of the art routing defenses. Congrats Weijia, Ilias, and Shahrooz!
We will be in The Hague this November, so reach out to us about those exciting research!
